[Review]Daniel C. Dennett_The Intentional Stance (2)

 Common Sense and the Third-Person Point of View

“ Some useful skirmishes in this campaign do consist of rigorous, formal explorations of particular sets of hunches. That is in fact the best light in which to view the various formalist failures of philosophy-as if they had been prefaced with "What if we made these assumptions and proceeded under these constraints?" As Fodor says, "The form of a philosophical theory, often enough, is: Let's try looking over here." (1981a, p. 31) Every formal system in philosophy must be "motivated," and the informal task of providing that motivation typically contributes more philosophical illumination (or at least doctrine) than the system for which it paves the way. There is always more than one candidate system or perspective crying out for philosophical exploration and development, and in such an unruly arena of thought, tactical considerations play an unusually important role. These tactical considerations often masquerade, however, as first principles. I begin, then, with a tactical choice. I declare my starting point to be the objective, materialistic, third-person world of the physical sciences. This is the orthodox choice today in the English-speaking philosophical world, but it has its detractors, most notably Nagel, who has devoted a book, The View From Nowhere (1986), to deploring the effects of this tactical choice. Since Nagel's is the major alternative starting point to mine, let us compare them briefly to see what we might be missing.”(1987. 4-5)

When dealing with Daniel C. Dennett's common sense, it is assumed that it relies on faith and intuition. They point out that the common sense underlying them can often simplify or mislead philosophical issues.(4) Common sense intuitions can be refuted by scientific and philosophical analysis, which means that our intuitions ‘may not always be’ a reliable basis for knowledge. Dennett's common sense refers to intuition and corresponding beliefs and thoughts in everyday life. Dennett criticizes the monistic nature of consciousness. Most people believe that their consciousness arises from a single, coherent “I.” However, Dennett argues that various neural processes and cognitive functions are intricately intertwined to create the phenomenon called “consciousness.” This can also be seen as raising questions about beliefs that many people intuit as ‘common sense.’

Immanuel Kant’s Common Sense

Immanuel Kant(1724-1804)

Although Dennett's common sense and Kant's common sense are used in different contexts, they can be connected in terms of subjectivity and objectivity, and the possibility of sharing personal experiences and experiences within a community.

„Wenn Geschmacksurteile (gleich den Erkenntnisurteilen) ein bestimmtes objektives Prinzip hätten, so würde der, welcher sie nach dem letztern fället, auf unbedingte Notwendigkeit seines Urteils Anspruch machen. Wären sie ohne alles Prinzip, wie die des bloßen Sinnengeschmacks, so würde man sich gar keine Notwendigkeit derselben in die Gedanken kommen lassen. Also müssen sie ein subjektives Prinzip haben, welches nur durch Gefühl und nicht durch Begriffe, doch aber allgemeingültig bestimme, was gefalle oder mißfalle. Ein solches Prinzip aber könnte nur als ein Gemeinsinn angesehen werden; welcher vom gemeinen Verstande, den man bisweilen auch Gemeinsinn (sensus communis) nennt, wesentlich unterschieden ist: indem letzterer nicht nach Gefühl, sondern jederzeit nach Begriffen, wiewohl gemeiniglich nur als nach dunkel vorgestellten Prinzipien, urteilt. Also nur unter der Voraussetzung, daß es einen Gemeinsinn gebe (wodurch wir aber keinen äußern Sinn, sondern die Wirkung aus dem freien Spiel unsrer Erkenntniskräfte, verstehen), nur unter Voraussetzung, sage ich, eines solchen Gemeinsinns kann das Geschmacksurteil gefällt werden.“(Immanuel Kant, Kritik Der Urteilskraft, Reclam, 1790, § 20)

I. Kant's common sense refers to the ability of individuals to go beyond their own subjective judgments, consider other people's perspectives, and make rational judgments as members of a community. In other words, this common sense appears as a norm that we can set as a rule for everyone else. This means “beautiful things” refer to things that are an object of satisfaction without a ‘concept’ as a common feeling. The common sense between Daniel Dennett and Immanuel Kant can be found in how individual experiences can be shared in a social setting and how this sharing forms the basis of human understanding and knowledge. Dennett's common sense is literally knowledge that all humans take for granted. This serves as a framework for analyzing why our beliefs in the community are based on them. On the other hand, Kant asked why we are commonly satisfied by seeing “Aesthetic things”, and called this kind of ability common sense. Therefore, strictly speaking, Kant's common sense is “Gemeinsinn,” meaning a common feeling. Despite these differences, humans can see that something is shared within a community context.

[Reference]

• Danial C. Dennett, The Intentional Stance, The MIT press, 1987.
• Immanuel Kant, Kritik Der Urteilskraft, Reclam, 1790.